

**Solonin M. The Second Finnish War // Transmission Transcript of June 26, 2006 - 17**

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Air

Guests: Mark Solonin

Hosts: Dmitry Zakharov

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Questions: 0 Read: 86

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ZAKHAROV: Good evening. The program "The Price of Victory" and I, its host, Dmitry Zakharov, are on the air. Vitaly Dymarsky is not with us today, but there is Mark Solonin, a historian whom you probably already know from our previous broadcasts and who is now starting work on a new book dedicated to the second Finnish war. I must say that the topic of the second war with Finland, I would call it that, and Finland's participation in the Great Patriotic War for some reason turned out to be very burning and topical for our listeners. This is probably why I invited Mark, who is starting to work on this topic in more depth and, perhaps, he is competent enough to tell about it in more detail to those who are interested in this topic. For our listeners, I remind you of the terrestrial telephones: 783-90-25 for Muscovites, 783-90-26 for residents of other cities, and our terrestrial pager number 725-66-33. So, Mark, what conclusions did you come to, dealing with this topic, raising it back in the book "June 22"?

M. SOLONIN: Yes, indeed, in the book that I actually always called and continue to call "Barrel and Hoop", which the marketing department of the EKSMO publishing house turned into this very "June 22", the whole first part, about a fifth part of the book was devoted to this strange story, then I called this chapter "The Lost War". This story is really lost, lost in our historiography and, I think, lost in the minds and memories of the vast majority of our listeners, because I noticed that even when talking with historians, or at least people with education, when the word "Finnish war" immediately recall the Winter War of 1939-40. But the war that once began, either on June 17, or on June 25, or on June 29, or on June 4, 1941, is generally very little known. Therefore, I have now, literally now, arrived from the Podolsky archive, where I have been working for two weeks. While I have questions, I personally have more questions as a result of this work in the archive than answers. I guess along the way

transmission, I will have to repeat the words of our founder of the genre, Viktor Suvorov, "I take my words back", already at some points I have to take my words back from what was written in the book. In general, I'm afraid that we won't succeed, Dmitry, as it was in the program before last, where I participated, that we are overwhelmed by an abundance of material and we can't get to the point. Therefore, I would like to spend literally a few minutes to at least outline the very outline of events, and then it will be possible to discuss something around this outline, discuss, and so on. So, the outline of events is as follows.

There is the city of Leningrad, this is clear to everyone.

**From Leningrad to the borders of East Prussia, that is, to the nearest line of location of enemy German troops, 750 km.** First, the enemy advancing on Leningrad must go through the entire Baltic, while forcing the two navigable rivers Neman and the Western Dvina or Daugava, as they call it there, after that he will already be on the Ostrov-Pskov line, then he needs to reach Luga, then he needs to cross the Luga River, after that he goes to the approaches to Leningrad, this is 750 km. It is curious to note that during those famous operational-strategic games that were in our high command in January 1941, where various options for a war with Germany were considered, there, according to the scenario of the game, in fact, according to the scenario of possible hostilities, the Westerners, that is, the Germans, in other words, they had the task of reaching the Western Dvina and crossing it in a month. This is what their job looked like. I must say right away that in real history they started the war, as you know, on June 22 at dawn and on the 25th they already crossed the Western Dvina near the city of Daugavpils or Dvinsk.

D. ZAKHAROV: We did it in three

days. M. SOLONIN: Well, three, four days, and by the end of June, that is,

during the **first week of the war, the Western Dvina was forced along its entire length and the German tank units reached this very**

**long, but still the finish line Ostrov - Pskov - Leningrad**, and the finish line because the two most powerful water barriers were passed by them. Now let's see what we have. Firstly, the Leningrad Military District had a sufficient number of rifle divisions, and the main strike forces were two mechanized corps, that is, two tank corps - the 1st and 10th. 1st, he was the first in number, and in terms of formation, and in terms of staffing, that is, there were more than a thousand tanks, that is, two tank, one motorized division; the tank divisions were filled to capacity with tanks, as expected, 370 tanks, tank trucks, car showers, a mobile red corner, there were flyers ..

D. ZAKHAROV: In general, the best case was, in fact.

M. SOLONIN: Yes. The 10th was much worse equipped, somewhere there was

no more than 400-450 old tanks. In addition, the Leningrad Military District had a very powerful aviation, approximately 1,200 combat aircraft, combat, I emphasize, not counting transport and auxiliary ones; in addition, Leningrad, as you know, is one of the largest bases of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, there was also a **powerful air force of about 700 aircraft.**

D. ZAKHAROV: Long-range aviation.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, there was indeed one of the long-range aviation corps, which was stationed near Novgorod, could also be oriented towards this theater. And the air defense of Leningrad itself, that is, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, five, in my opinion, or six radar stations, was even more powerful than the air defense of Moscow, and since the air defense of Moscow was much more powerful than the air defense of London or Berlin, you can imagine, What was it. This is such a disposition. Now let's move on to events.

Events began on June 17, which was Thursday, **June 17, 1941, when one of the two tank divisions of the 1st mechanized corps**, namely the first in a row, **the 1st tank division loaded at a frantic pace, at a frantic pace within one and a half to two days**, and I repeat once again, this is 370 tanks, this is about 5 thousand All sorts of wheeled vehicles, about 100 pieces of artillery, loaded into railway cars and went somewhere. And **she went to the Arctic.** And June 22,

well, it's just a coincidence, **June 22, 1941**, exactly

then, when what began on the western border of the Soviet Union began, **the 1st Panzer Division unloaded near the Finnish border in the area of the city of Allakurte, this is already the Arctic**, this is already the tundra.

Unfortunately, we have radio air, not TV air, so it's rather difficult to explain, but try to imagine that Finland is shaped like a boot on the map, it has a narrow part, and near this narrowest part, where you can take the shortest path to pass from the Soviet border to the opposite border of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia, that's where the only railway and road in those places passes, and it was there that the 1st Panzer Division unloaded.

June 22 came, **the war with Germany began, the 1st, already without one division, and the 10th mechanized corps were raised on combat alert**, and on the evening of the 22nd - in the morning of the 23rd they set off. And the path was like this. Try to imagine three trains: all moving from west to east and a little north. **Germans, the 4th Panzer Group is moving from the Soviet border to the Western Dvina.** In the same direction,

from west to east, the 1st tank corps from Pskov to Leningrad, and also **to the east and north, again moving away from the advancing Germans, the 10th mechanized corps is moving from Leningrad to the Finnish border.** This strange movement takes several days,

around the 25th, 26th, 27th everyone goes to their place: the 1st tank corps to Leningrad, the 10th - to the Finnish

border. And the 25th comes, on **June 25, what happens is that in those few Soviet books that write about it, it is described as follows, that Soviet aviation carried out the most powerful, largest operation in the initial period of the war**, during which, according to Novikov, this is an air marshal in the future, and at that moment the commander of the Leningrad Military District, it looks very nice, according to him. In short, they flew to bomb Finland, in short.

Novikov writes: "Air armada of 263 bombers and 224 fighters rushed to the 18 most important enemy airfields. The raid lasted several hours. One group of aircraft replaced another. Some objects were subjected to three or four impacts. The enemy was taken by surprise, unable to organize resistance, as a result of the first day, the enemy lost 41 combat vehicles. Success was evident and the operation continued. In air battles and on the ground, the enemy lost 130 aircraft. This is the first multi-day operation in the history of Soviet aviation that convinced us...", well, and so on.

That is, they flew to bomb Finland, then nothing happens, but just a few days later, **in the first days of July, the tank motorized units of the 10th mechanized corps crossed the Finnish border and even tried to slightly advance on the territory of Finland.**

These not entirely clear disparate events are taking place on in the north, take place on the border with Finland, **while a complete catastrophe occurs in the Baltic states**, that is, the North-Western Front, **the Baltic Military District is almost completely defeated in less than a week**, the Germans are forcing the Western Dvina, the Daugava.

The Germans begin to advance on Ostrov - this is such a city, the city of Ostrov - and then on to Pskov and Pskov, and only about the 4th, but some parts even earlier, that is, in the first days of July, finally, the Stavka begins again just as feverishly, in such **a at the same frantic pace, remove tank motorized units from the Finnish border** and again exactly back to Pskov, and then even further **towards the advancing Germans.**

They meet with the advancing German units in the Rezekne or Rezhets area, along the current Ostrov, **they are defeated in a few days and then the Germans go to the Luga line**, where only then at the Luga line they begin to stop the divisions of the Leningrad militia with bottles of gasoline and kerosene. Here is such a canvas. **The question arises, what was it?**

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, just a second, here's a pager from Alexander Vasilyevich: "June 17 could not be Thursday, because June 22 is Sunday."

M. SOLONIN: So it was Tuesday, I'm sorry, they clarified it.

D. ZAKHAROV: So, a thousand tanks of the 1st mechanized corps and more than 400 of the 10th had already run out by this time.

M. SOLONIN: For the most part, they are gone. **The 1st Panzer Division remained in the Arctic, it was pulled apart into separate units there**, it fought for a long time, even until the fall.

D. ZAKHAROV: And quite successfully. M.

SOLONIN: And she even fought quite successfully, but many questions arise. For example, **what was a tank division to do in the Arctic, in the tundra among boulders, swamps and lakes?** D.

ZAKHAROV: In the absence of German tanks.

M. SOLONIN: **In the absence of German tanks and in general, the terrain is clearly anti-tank.** Why, despite the obvious growing catastrophe in the Baltic states, did the most powerful units that could somehow fend off this blow and this German breakthrough move in the same direction as the enemy, that is, to the east? And, finally, **what did happen on June 25** and for what

necessary, **the first, largest air operation of the Soviet aviation in the initial period of the war** was carried out, which turned out to be directed not against the Luftwaffe, which was outrageous and seized complete air supremacy, but why did these **540 aircraft** fly to bomb Finland?

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, for what? Here, perhaps, it is necessary to make a remark that **in these days the Finnish aviation and Finnish troops did not take any active actions against the Soviet Union**, and the main question that always arises among listeners is according to such a canonical version of the war ...

M. SOLONIN: Quite right, there is a canonical answer to this question. The canonical answer, I emphasize again, in those few books that mentioned this story at all, let's say, **at the level of a school textbook, this story simply was not mentioned**, so I think it is unknown to most of the public, but there is a canonical answer, which is the fact that **the transfer of the 1st Panzer Division to the Arctic is ignored in general, the strange movements of the 1st and 10th mechanized corps are ignored altogether, the invasion, albeit unsuccessful, albeit for several kilometers, but still the invasion of parts of the 10th mechanized corps into the territory of Finland in the first days of July, it is ignored altogether**, of all the events, only June 25 remains: yes, June 25 was, yes, they really flew to bomb, because Luftwaffe formations were located on Finnish airfields and there was a real threat that they

strike at Leningrad, and in order to prevent this strike, 540 aircraft flew.  
**There is such a canonical version.**

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. And what did they do?

M. SOLONIN: What they did - we will definitely come to this, this is exactly what my RAM is full of now, I say, I just came from the Podolsky archive, but for now we will still clarify some points. **The discussion, probably, since the publication of my book, even from the posting of this first chapter on the Internet,** I have already seen a huge number of discussions about this, and usually all my opponents want to discuss the politics of Finland. They **quite rightly say that Finland was not friendly with the Soviet Union,** that she was in a bad mood towards him and that she hatched plans for revenge. To all my opponents, I say that you are absolutely right, I completely agree with you and do not even see the need to waste time discussing the arguments. Yes, of course, after **Finland turned out to be the object of unprovoked aggression in 1939,** after she, with enormous efforts, enormous for her scale, and with enormous sacrifices, somehow managed to hold back the advance of the gigantic Soviet army, while **losing twelve percent their territory, having been forced to resettle about a fifth of the population,** because **everyone left the Karelian Isthmus, no one remained under Soviet rule ...**

D. ZAKHAROV: **About half a million people.**

M. SOLONIN: Everyone left, yes, and even the ethnic Russians who lived there for centuries and generations left. Of course, there could be no friendship on the part of Finland, and, of course, the Finnish leadership, in full accordance with the moods and views of the entire Finnish people, did not feel morally obliged to fulfill the conditions of that Moscow so-called peace treaty, which on March 13, 1940 was imposed on them, imposed, as they say, at gunpoint, pistol and so on. Yes, of course, Finland's policy was not friendly and, of course, Finland, which the Soviet Union pressed, literally as soon as the ink on the treaty dried up, the Soviet Union began to press Finland. The first pressing, I only recently, unfortunately, found out about it, to my shame I recently found out, the first pressing took place already on March 20, 1940, that is, on the 13th they signed an agreement and already on the 20th the Soviet troops simply took and crossed the border, established by this agreement, and occupied the city of Enso, which is now called not Enso at all, but the city of Svetlogorsk, and simply confronted the Finn with a fact. And what could they do - they were forced to withdraw, because the country was

on one's last legs.

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, the pager has started working, here is Svetlana from Moscow writing: "In the program of Echo" Well and Day "on June 25, 1940, Finland declared war on the USSR. Maybe, in response to this, we flew to bomb Finland?"

M. SOLONIN: Well, this is a very simple question. Here the chronology was different. In the morning , **Soviet aircraft flew to bomb Finland, at about 6 o'clock in the morning they flew to bomb it, and on the evening of the 25th, the Finnish parliament decided that they were at war with the Soviet Union,** the sequence was just that. Well, everything is very clear here.

D. ZAKHAROV: As a matter of fact, since June 22, actions against Finland have already been carried out, she endured.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, but now I want us not to miss the main point again. In this program, in the forty minutes we have available, we do not discuss the politics of Finland. We discuss what the Soviet military and political leadership did and try to understand why they acted the way they did. It seems to me that in order to answer this question, we do not need to obviously discuss, namely, the hatred felt by the Finnish leadership and the Finnish people towards the Soviet Union, but discuss something else: was there a threat, the danger that Finland created for Leningrad, **for The Soviet Union is at least comparable to the threat that rolled in the face of the 4th Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht** through the Baltic States to Leningrad? In my opinion, this is precisely the question through which we can somehow try to reconstruct the logic of the actions of the Soviet leadership. **Finnish aviation, which, according to the canonical version, posed such a huge threat to** the city of Lenin that it was necessary to throw 540 aircraft in a preventive strike, Finnish aviation had 24 bombers. I didn't make a reservation. **Finnish aviation had 24 bombers, of which 3 were captured Soviet ones** that made an emergency landing in the Winter War, and the remaining 21 were English Blenheims, well, aircraft of the era of our "SB".

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, and in many respects similar in characteristics.

M. SOLONIN: Similar. As part of the aviation of the Leningrad District and the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, there were only 850 fighters and, as I already mentioned, there were more anti-aircraft artillery forces than in the air defense of Berlin or London. In my opinion, further discuss the issue that 24 Finnish bombers posed such a threat that they could not, and, by the way, there were, in my opinion, 162 newest MiGs, that Soviet fighters could not repel this strike in any way and it was necessary to strike preemptive strike on airfields - well, as, for example, Israel did in 1967 - in my opinion,

just absurd, you can not discuss further. And the next topic, well, yes, my opponents say, of course, Finnish aviation, of course, this is all nonsense, but the Germans were there. Right now, right now, I can already say for sure that there was no German aviation in Finland at all, and in southern Finland, which became the object of this massive strike on June 25, there never was, that is, after the start of the war in the Arctic ...

D. ZAKHAROV: A small remark. These are the conclusions that Mark draws from the study of official archives.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, these are the conclusions that I made on the basis of the intelligence reports of those five aviation divisions, the cases of which I have already studied. There are intelligence reports there, the deployment of enemy aircraft is shown there, and so on. In addition, there is a huge array of studies by German and already Russian historians about the history of the Luftwaffe, it is painted in detail, in my opinion, with an accuracy of each squadron, you can indicate where someone was based. **Until the 25th, I emphasize once again, in general, not a single part of the Luftwaffe was based in Finland.** After the start of active hostilities in the Arctic - yes, indeed, of the order, maybe one or two squadrons, a shtafel, were based on the northern polar Finnish airfields, but where the events we are talking about unfolded, that is, the events of June 25 and before the first the dates of July, that is, there was not a single German aircraft in southern Finland, moreover, there was an agreed line of responsibility that passed in a strange way through the Soviet city of Kem and the Finnish Kem, or vice versa, maybe, I confuse it, approximately in the middle, if you look at the map - everything to the north, there was the area of responsibility of the Luftwaffe, and that which was to the south was simply the area of responsibility of the Finnish aviation, the Germans simply never appeared there.

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, another canonical, I don't even know what to call it, version. Nikolai from Moscow: "The actions of Finland on the side of Germany were the Barbarossa plan. On the flanks of our operation, we can count on the actions of Romania and Finland. If these data were received in Moscow, then there is nothing surprising in the maneuvers of the mechanized corps." Well, sort of the standard wording.

M. SOLONIN: Once again. I will strongly fight off attempts to start discussing Finland's plans and intentions. Firstly, the fact that the Germans believed that the Finns would be their ally is constantly ... well, I have been in the field of discussion for a long time. Yes, indeed, on the morning of June 22, when Hitler spoke, addressed the Reichstag and the German people, he said that in the north our brothers in arms, the Finns, stand shoulder to shoulder with us. Yes, he said so. And a few hours later, the Finnish Foreign Ministry officially disavowed this statement, saying that there were no grounds for this, no one anywhere



costs. Moreover, a few hours later, Ribbentrop was forced to attend a press conference - of course, he could not correct his Fuhrer so rudely - but, in general, he once said that we got a little excited. So, **on the 22nd, Finland declared its neutrality in the outbreak of war, on the 23rd, 24th, Germany, England, the USA and the Soviet Union declared the recognition of Finland's neutrality.** I emphasize, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, if the Soviet Union, as Nikolai from Moscow writes to us, had concerns about how Finland would behave in the outbreak of war, then there is a well-known well-established procedure: first they invite the ambassador, they hand him a note, if they don't understand, they recall the ambassador, then they break off diplomatic relations, and then, perhaps, they resort to military measures. The ambassador was indeed summoned and informed that the Soviet Union would respect the neutrality of Finland, therefore, from the legal point of view, **what happened at dawn on June 25** fully corresponds to what happened on June 22 on the Soviet-German border, that **is, a treacherous attack, there is no other way to call it it is impossible**, because the Soviet Union did not at all declare that it was very worried about something.

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, here's another one, Artem from Moscow: "There was no German Air Force at the Finnish airfields, well, maybe that's why there wasn't any because of the demonstrative raid of the Soviet Air Force?"

M. SOLONIN: Oh, great. Now we are moving from something that, let's say, everyone knows, well, everyone who has read the available Soviet books, to something that simply made the remnants of my hair stand on end when I began to get acquainted with the real documents preserved in the Podolsky archive. As our comrade said - a demonstrative raid? That is, now I must directly repent before the readers of my book, I am there ... well, I believed Air Marshal Novikov that such a brilliant operation was, and had the imprudence to write that Soviet aviation fiercely bombed Finnish airfields.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, in Novikov's understanding, she bombed fiercely.

M. SOLONIN: Nevertheless, there are absolutely specific words there. It says that on the first day 41 Finnish aircraft were destroyed in the sky and on the ground, that we did not suffer losses - this is stated by Novikov and Kozhevnikov, a well-known two-volume monograph. And so I open the cases of two bomber divisions - the 41st and 2nd. And now I'm not too lazy to read this matter to you specifically, how they flew to fiercely bomb this very Finland. The 41st Aviation Division, which had a little more than 100 serviceable aircraft on the first day of this massive raid, made 62 sorties, that is, not even everyone flew once.

D. ZAKHAROV: This is SB.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, these are SB bombers. The results were like this. The 201st Bomber Aviation Regiment, consisting of 18 aircraft, flew to bomb the Finnish airfield. They didn't find the airfield, they bombed on a spare target, while they were attacked, as it is written in the report, this is the operational summary of the headquarters of this regiment, they were attacked by 9 enemy aircraft of the ME-119 type, not the ME 109, which was in reality, but "ME-119"...

D. ZAKHAROV: And the Finns didn't have the ME-109 then.

M. SOLONIN: The Finns did not have the ME-109, and the ME-119 did not exist at all.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, just as "ME-109" was not there at all at that time.

M. SOLONIN: I continue to quote. The latter, that is, the aircraft, had identification marks "red stars". What this means is not clear. It is further said that enemy fighters opened fire from 50-70 meters.

D. ZAKHAROV: Good pilots.

M. SOLONIN: That is, from such a distance one could see what happened and, as this very report admits, 6 out of 18 aircraft were shot down. If we now take and look at what Finnish historians write about this, then they write that yes, indeed, 18 Soviet bombers flew into this very airfield, not 9 mythical ME 119s took off into the air, but 2 Buruster fighters, these are American fighters, let's say, at the level of the latest modifications of the Ishaks, which shot down 6 SBs in fifteen minutes without losing a single one of these two in the air and without losing anything on the ground. The 10th bomber regiment of the same 41st air division flew to bomb the Mikkeli airfield. The materiel of enemy aircraft was not found. They were bombed, it is not clear where, the bombs fell along the edge of the airfield. Then the next group flew to bomb, and there were 32 in total, that is, again, one of the two planes flew one for the whole day, they flew to bomb the Mutiharya airfield, the Mutiharya airfield was not found, like the previous one. The 202nd Bomber Aviation Regiment flew to bomb the Valkealkia airfield. They found this very airfield and even hit it. According to the report of the pilots, a flash was visible on the ground. At the same time, again, one aircraft was shot down and another aircraft was damaged. Thus, a whole division, more than 100 serviceable bombers, according to German standards, 100 bombers on the first day of the war on June 22 would have made at least 200-300 sorties, but made 61 sorties, lost 8 of their aircraft, having done nothing on Finnish airfields.

When I read this case, I said to myself "stop, stop, don't rush, you got an incomprehensible slovenly division, we must move on." We move on and find the 2nd Aviation Division, you see, it is a small number, this is an old division. The 2nd Air Division had three regiments, and two of them were called not just a bomber regiment, but the Red Banner. These regiments participated in the Finnish Winter War, flew a lot there and were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War. Their first day looked like this. The 2nd Bomber Aviation Regiment, with 44 operational aircraft, carried out 9 sorties.

D. ZAKHAROV: That is, out of 44, only 9 aircraft flew.

M. SOLONIN: They flew to bomb the Luumyaki airfield. The enemy materiel was not found at the airfield, but 5 enemy fighters were found, which rose and shot down 2 out of 9 aircraft from them. At the same time, the 44th Red Banner Bomber Aviation Regiment, which has 46 combat-ready aircraft, flew to fight. On the first day of the massive operation, 46 combat-ready aircraft made eighteen sorties, that is, approximately one out of three. They flew in four groups. They got it that way. The Utti airfield was not found and the Kuuvola railway station was bombed. And they bombed like that. Two of our planes collided in the air, one crashed completely, one remained intact, maybe they hit somewhere. The second group nevertheless flew again to bomb the Utti airfield, found it, and from a height of 6.5 km, three aircraft threw something at the airfield. Well, I think there is no need to explain that in the era before laser homing bombs, throwing from 6.5 km - well, these bombs could simply not be loaded.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Well, throw it anywhere.

M. SOLONIN: The 58th Red Banner Bomber Regiment made 15 sorties with 52 crews. Borgo airfield was not found, instead some unfortunate village with a very long name was bombed, well, and so on in the same spirit.

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, unfortunately, time is running out for us. Here is a question. Without a name and without a city: "Mark, well, well, the Finns were not allies of the Germans. Is it easier for the Leningrad blockades or will you say that they did not have and did not hold their sector of the ring?"

M. SOLONIN: About two years ago I published a long article in two issues in Samara in our regional newspaper "Volzhskaya Kommuna" entitled "Who blockaded Leningrad." I said in writing that **Leningrad was blocked by the Finns** and, of course, drew the attention of readers to this. And I wonder how out of everything we're here

we say, one could conclude that the Finns were not allies of Germany. I repeat once again, the Finns, of course, hated the Soviet Union and were ready on this basis to unite even with the bald devil, but **in that particular situation they had to unite with Hitler**. I absolutely do not deny it.

D. ZAKHAROV: After the 25th, again, we will make a reservation. Because **if the Soviet Union recognized the neutrality of Finland, declared on the 24th, then there would simply be no blockade of Leningrad**.

M. SOLONIN: That would simply not exist, quite right, as I wrote in this two-year-old article of mine, that **Stalin could have interrupted the blockade of Leningrad with one stroke of the pen, that is, it was possible not to create it**. It's just that with the start of the war, when the whole situation in the world changed, that is, the two greatest powers - the United States of America and the British Empire became our allies to Stalin's extreme surprise, an opportunity arose for completely new diplomatic steps, namely, they made peace with Poland, with the Polish In August 1941, the Sikorsky government signed an agreement in which it was written in black and white that the Soviet-German agreements concerning territorial changes in Poland had lost their force, that is, generally speaking, in August 1941, in writing, on paper, the Soviet government recognized **that the so-called liberation campaign in Western Belarus, Western Ukraine has lost its legal force** - no, someone else's must be given away. **If the same were done with Finland**, that is, if they really did not just declare the recognition of neutrality, but would support it, if they at least promised, with the assistance of the British and Americans after the war, at least to discuss the issue and somehow push something back, then there would be none of what we are talking about now, and, most importantly, **there would be no blockade of Leningrad and two million victims**.

D. ZAKHAROV: Another canonical version: "In the second volume of the seven-volume book The Nuremberg Trials, there is the testimony of Colonel Kechman, the former Finnish military attaché, who tells in detail about the preparation of Hitler's best friend Mannerheim for aggression against the USSR together with Germany." Well, as if inescapable version, I would say. Kirill Serzhsky signed up. Here's another: "Mark, as you know, the Finns were great experts in fortification. How did they deal with the technical condition of military airfields?"

M. SOLONIN: Great. Here we are, finally, again returning to June 25th. June 25, which, according to Novikov and Kozhevnikov, ended with the fact that our aviation had no losses, and 41 Finnish aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground, ended differently. Only by the fact that I could calculate and sum up, the Finns shot down 20 of ours in the air

SB bombers, and, curiously, in all these operational reports there are no traces of fighter cover. That is, according to the canonical version, 250 bombers flew, about 250 fighters, but when it came down to it, those 2 or 3 Finnish fighters that took to the air destroyed our "SB" without any opposition from Soviet fighters. In general, during the entire operation on the ground, according to Finnish data, 3 aircraft were indeed damaged. That was the state of the art.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, if you throw bombs from 6.5 km...

M. SOLONIN: It simply couldn't be anything else. That is, the situation was almost farcical, because hoping to destroy a camouflaged aircraft at an airfield during a bombardment from 6.5 km is nonsense.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, without actually seeing the airfield as such. Here is another canonical version: "What is the neutrality of Finland? What, do you believe the diplomats? Romania and Finland showed the greed of the hyena." Here, before Mark answers, I would like to say one thing: we believe in the facts and documents that we work with.

M. SOLONIN: Dmitry, you understand, as they say, the comrade did not understand me, so I will repeat with pleasure: I do not at all claim that Finland was a friend of the Soviet Union. In the real situation in which she was driven by the Stalinist government of the Soviet Union, she **was an ally of Germany. Her neutrality was very, very shaky.** At any moment she was ready to join Germany. In this situation, the Soviet Union had two options: **it was possible to do what corresponded to the new situation, that is, with the help of our new allies and old allies - the Anglo-Americans, to withdraw Finland from a possible war through diplomacy,** promising to give back what was stolen. **It was possible to take a different path, that is, to aggravate the crime that was once committed by the next.** Yes, as a result, Finland began to snap with all the forces at her disposal, in particular, with the help of an alliance with Germany, which she helped first with grain, then with planes and whatever.

D. ZAKHAROV: A reply to me: "Mr. Zakharov, one more such broadcast and you will have no listeners left." Well what can I say? Well, it's not interesting - do not listen. The issue of Finland's participation for those who are interested in the history of the Great Patriotic War is by no means unimportant.

M. SOLONIN: We will have one less listener, this is probably true.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, this is the personal right of this person. We have little time left. Let's try to answer at least two or three calls. Hello, good evening.

LISTENER: Good evening. Konstantin from Shchelkovo. I wanted to say that you do not get acquainted with the main literature on the Great Patriotic War. So, Zhukov writes: all amphibious landings were made from April 10 to April 29, up to 22 thousand German troops were landed, which later followed further, that is, clearly Finland participated in the preparations for the Soviet Union. And you are talking nonsense. Second. The well-known fascist strategist von Manstein writes in his book that the general impression of the enemy was such that he was not taken by surprise by our offensive in the front line, but that the Soviet command did not count or did not count on him and therefore was not able to quickly pull up the available in his command of large forces.

M. SOLONIN: Excellent, that's what we're talking about, that not only did it not bring up its large forces, but sent its large forces in the exact opposite direction. Here **the Germans were advancing from west to east and two tank corps of the Leningrad Front were leaving in the same direction, from west to east.** Not only were they not pulling up, they were rapidly pulling up in the exact opposite direction.

D. ZAKHAROV: Hello, we are listening to you. Good evening.

LISTENER: Hello. Thank you very much for your transmission and please don't read any bastard's letters, why are you reading them?

M. SOLONIN: People express their opinion, I express mine. Why such expressions?

D. ZAKHAROV: And then, you see, people have the right to be wrong if they want to be wrong. **We state only the facts available from open sources.**

M. SOLONIN: We read out the written question in normal vocabulary, it's okay.

D. ZAKHAROV: "Dmitry, studies have shown that your program is the most listened to of all radio programs at 23:00. Thank you, good luck. Marina." Thank you, Marina, on your kind words, we do not seek to acquire any special laurels, but nevertheless. "May I steal a question from Suvorov? Which of Zhukov's 13 publications would you like to believe? Kirill Serbsky, Moscow." Mark, who will you trust from Zhukov's 13 publications? I personally don't have one.

M. SOLONIN: You see, what a disaster. This is understandable, the problem is that some of the documents that are stored in the archives begin to make a strange impression on me, that is, I find that operational summary No. 3 was signed earlier than operational summary No. 2, that is, again, all the ill-fated June 25 for one of the aviation divisions, in particular. In general, it is difficult to understand who to believe. We managed to identify one tenth or one hundredth of everything that happened in these very strange days, and I get the **impression either of some kind of complete absurdity, complete inconsistency in general in the actions of all components of the Soviet military machine**, or even some deliberate falsification of documents. Well, I find absolutely incomprehensible things. When one of the divisions of the 10th mechanized corps goes to the Finnish border, then it receives an order, and completely strange things happened there ... he held it in his hands, a quarter of paper, handwritten in pencil by the chief of staff of the Leningrad district, who directly, bypassing all the main links, orders the division commander to stop and be ready either to immediately turn around and go back or continue the offensive forward. Well, they don't fight like that.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Here is Artyom from Moscow: "The greed of the hyena - I didn't come up with it, it was Churchill who said that about Finland. He probably knew better." Well, of course, Churchill spent his whole life in Finland, this is understandable. It's not about that. The fact is that there is common sense, and **after the war of 1939, Finland never wanted to fight with the Soviet Union**. Almost half a million people are forced to flee, a huge piece of territory has been lost. Well, it is clear that if there is another war with the Soviet Union, then it will end quite badly for the Finns, even if Stalin decides to kill several million people. Well, he will capture this Finland. Therefore, they did not want to fight with us. Natalia, Moscow: "Thank you, my late father was wounded in the head near Leningrad and spent the whole blockade in the hospital, but survived. For me, everything you say today is priceless." Thanks, Natalia. Here it is without a signature: "My Jewish friends, when will Israel give back what was stolen?"

M. SOLONIN: Don't wait.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. "Why such a strange broadcast? The main thing in the war is the Holocaust, and the Russians were passing by." Well, we didn't mention the Holocaust at all. We have one minute left for one more call. Hello, we are listening. Hello.

LISTENER: Hello. Svetlana, Moscow. Tell,

please, why did Stalin, as you said, not lift the blockade with a stroke of the pen? After all, he knew what was happening in the city, that people were dying, all this monstrous?

D. ZAKHAROV: May I answer, Mark? Thanks for the question. You understand, the fact is that if the events that took place from June 22 to June 25 had not happened, there would have been no blockade, as we say, and Finland would not have entered this war. They did not need this war, because it would have ended very badly for Finland.

M. SOLONIN: And yet, even after that, it was possible to remove it with a stroke of the pen, but all the actions were completely in the opposite direction and in **1944 they went as far as presenting Finland with a demand for unconditional surrender.**

D. ZAKHAROV: It's time for another "portrait" of Elena Syanova.

"PORTRAIT GALLERY" ELENA SIANOVA

"Among the guests, a dark-haired man with a short cropped mustache, amiable and courteous, attracted attention. I talked with him for a long time, we discussed Douglas's book Economic Democracy. I must have said something that interested this gentleman very much, the face his eyes lit up, his eyes opened so wide that whites became visible. He seemed to approve of everything I said, but only until the moment when I reached the main point that completed my thought. It just turned out to be exactly the opposite his own opinion and his face suddenly expressed the utmost degree of disappointment. Those bulging whites of the eyes and a wide smiling mouth remained in my memory like a strange frightening mask. This was Charlie Chaplin's first impression of Sir Oswald Mosle, the man who in 1931 was called the "English Hitler". The British Union of Fascists was officially founded on 1 October 1932. As an emblem, Moslet chose the ancient Roman symbol of power: a bundle of rods tied with a belt with an ax in the middle - a fascia. A bunch of rods was supposed to symbolize the strength of unity, and an ax - the supreme power of an organized state. Members of the union were dressed in black shirts, special vehicles with symbols were allocated for them, their own newspaper "Blackshet" appeared, and so on. The case was conceived broadly, thoroughly. Moslet himself considered himself a progressive economist, offered the government all kinds of programs and plans, and just like Hitler, he hoped for the main thing - the capital that would bring him to power. But time passed, and British capital somehow managed without Sir Oswald, and in 1934, when the Fascist Union already had 50,000 members, Mosley's patience snapped. He announced that his "black shirts" were ready to follow the example of the Italian brothers and arrange a march on London. The slogan was chosen as follows: "From the streets to



This is where the main miscalculation of this kind of filibusters from politics, taking out smuggling and other people's experience under the black flag of outright banditry, affected. In the autumn of 1934, when Mosle gathered 3,000 of his guys in Hyde Park, about 100,000 strong anti-fascists immediately gathered there, and how this meeting ended, imagine for yourself. British history, perhaps, did not yet know the killed politician, and Sir Oswald was beaten from the right, and from the left, and from above in the literal sense of the word. After another fiasco, Mosle usually went to complain to Mussolini or Hitler, who, in my opinion, did not count on British blackshet, saying that they have a great leader, but poor organization. A statement that, in my opinion, is absurd or poisonous. From 1935, Mosle adopted a different symbol: a lightning bolt in a circle, which meant action in a circle of unity. This circle was not only the ruling Fuhrers, but also the leaders of the so-called fascist international, for example, the leader of the French "fiery crosses" De la Rocque, the leader of the Romanian fascists Kadriano, the Hungarian "arrows crossed" Salase, the leader of the Croatian Ustashe Povelic - a beast to look for. You can also remember the Norwegian Quisling, the Finnish Kosola, the Belgian De Grel. All these are people on whom their peoples put a shameful stigma, as on fallen women in the Middle Ages. It is worth reading about Mosle's attempts to fascist England, in which, by the way, the Irish Catholic O'Daifi helped him. I can only say that even after the war this patriarch was demonstratively beaten dozens of times. But at this time, young shoots imperceptibly grew from the seeds thrown by him. Alas, Sir Oswald's wall photographs are now increasingly seen in some of the homes of the respectable British electorate.

D. ZAKHAROV: With this, our today's program is inevitably coming to an end. We discussed the topic of the second Finnish war, and historian Mark Solonin was our guest. The next broadcast is in a week and we will be visiting another historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, with whom we will discuss what Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and his inner circle did after June 22. Thank you. print version

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